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FEDERAL TRUST RESPONSIBILITY AND CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION OR NATURAL
RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT?*
MR. RICE:I On a serious note today, if you would. As the
introduction said, I'm an Okie. For those of you who may not be
familiar with what is going on down there, the Federal Building was
bombed yesterday. The HUD Indian desk was in there, as well as a lot of
federal employees who dealt with Indians extensively in -the state of
Oklahoma. And I'd like to reserve just a moment of silence; I'd like
each of you in your own way, if you would, to ask our Creator to make a
way for those people and their loved ones today. Thank you very much.
Trust responsibility is a wonderful thing. I have wondered for nigh
unto 15 years what it means, how you enforce it, what it is to be
enforced, and those types of things. Perhaps the best way I can express
my frustrations with it is to tell a war story. I represented a tribe who
entered into oil and gas leases. One of those leases was relatively old but
had a clause that said that if that lessee were to assign, sublet, or otherwise
convey any interest in the lease whatsoever absent the express consent of
the Secretary of the Interior, that act was a material and substantial
breach of the terms and conditions of the lease and cause for
cancellation. The tribe looked around one day and realized that it had a
lease with this oil company and hadn't seen it in four or five years. In
fact, about 14 or 15 other oil companies were out there on the leases,
wandering around drilling wells, working wells, hauling off oil. And the
tribe scratched its head and asked the BIA, "Well, who is our lessee?"
And the BIA in its ultimate wisdom went through its records and said,
"XYZ Oil Company is your lessee of record." And the tribe said, "We
haven't seen XYZ in four or five years. Who are all these other oil
companies?" And the BIA said, "It doesn't matter. We don't know.
They must be XYZ operators." And the tribe went to XYZ and said,
"Who are all these other oil companies?" "Oh, those are just our
drillers and pumpers." And then we got a notice that a bank was
thinking about foreclosing on the tribe's trust property because the
mortgage entered into by one of these drillers on the tribal trust property
was in default. The tribe came to me and said, "Brother, what's going
* The following are edited proceedings from the North Dakota Law Review Symposium
Conference. Held at the University of North Dakota on April 20, 1995, this panel discussion was
premised on Judith Royster's article entitled Equivocal Obligations: The Federal-Tribal Trust
Relationship and Conflicts of Interest in the Development of Mineral Resources. 71 N.D. L. REV. 327
(1995).
1. Currently Director of the Northern Plains Tribal Judicial Training Institute at the University of
North Dakota School of Law. Mr. Rice is also a member of the North Dakota Supreme Court's
Committee on Tribal and State affairs.
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on?" And I did what I think any self-respecting Indian lawyer would
do. I ran over to the BIA and looked through all of their lease records,
and everything goes to XYZ, the lessee of record. So I went down to the
county courthouse, and in about 20 minutes came up with (I would say
37) assignments and conveyances and subleasings of the tribal mineral
estate. That convinced me very quickly that we had a problem and that
it was going to take more than what I could do in a stand up title opinion
over there.
So we ordered formal title opinions from the real estate companies
in the area and came back with a stack of them about so thick
(indicating) and found out that, in fact, there had been horizontal
assignments, there had been subleases, there had been mortgages, there
had been all kinds of other activity, buying, selling, transferring the
tribe's mineral estate. When we had the documents in hand and the
written record in hand to prove it, I said to the tribe, "We've got two
options. We could run over and file in tribal, federal, or possibly state
court, or we can go over and see your trustee, the BIA. I hate to beat
myself out of a fee, but they're supposed to take care of this stuff for
you." So we decided we'd go see what the BIA had to say about it. We
went to visit the area director and walked into his office, (he had his
realtor guy, his solicitor, and all of his other guys there) laid down a
stack of title abstracts about so high on top of his desk with nice yellow
stickies in there at every one of them we wanted him to see, and said,
"See this here lease and see this here clause that says this is time for
cancellation of the lease? See these 37 different places where they
breached the lease and lied to you? We want you to cancel the lease."
And the long and short of it was the BIA area director said, "Oh, we
can't cancel this lease. It might make the oil company mad, and they'll
sue us." And we said, "How about the trust responsibility?" And they
said, "Oh, they'll get mad, and the oil company might sue us."
The long and short is the tribe had to bear the brunt of the lawsuit.
We did cancel the leases and got some decent damages out of it in the
tribal court system. And the trust responsibility of the United States is
still hanging out there somewhere. So that's what our panel is going to
talk about. And I would like to introduce them very shortly. I'm not
going to tell a whole bunch of lies about them because most of their vitas
are in your packet. We have Richard Monette down on the end, law
professor from the University of Wisconsin; Bruce Duthu, law professor
at Vermont; one of my recognized elders in the field of Indian law,
Brother Sam Deloria from the American Indian Law Center at the
University of New Mexico, Albuquerque; Robert Clinton from Iowa; and
the last of my colleagues here, Judith Royster from Tulsa. She will be
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presenting her paper, Equivocal Obligations:The Federal-Tribal
Relationship and Conflict Development of Tribal Resources.
PRESENTATION BY JUDITH ROYSTER

Equivocal Obligations: The Federal-TribalTrust Relationship
and Conflicts of Interest in the Development of Mineral
Resources.
MR. RICE: Professor Royster, by the way, is the Director of the
certificate program in Native American law that is active at the University
of Tulsa School of Law. Next on my list we have Brother Clinton, who is
currently the Wiley B. Rutledge Professor of Law at the University of
Iowa College of Law. He took his B.A. from Michigan and his J.D.
from the University of Chicago. He is also an Associate Justice of the
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Appellate Court and walks around with a
book called AMERICAN INDIAN LAW- CASES AND MATERIALS under his
arm so that everybody can see his name on it in bright, bold letters.
MR. CLINTON: Thank you very much. With your permission I'm
going to sit here. Can you hear me in the back? In commenting on
Professor Royster's paper, I'm not going to comment directly on its
many interesting points. Rather, I want to use most of my time to set the
trust responsibility in some framework. In light of that framework, I will
try to at the end of my remarks to tackle some of the questions that
Professor Royster has raised since these are important questions. I would
submit to you that probably no doctrine of federal Indian law is as
conflicted in Indian country and among Indian tribes as the trust
responsibility. There's a love/hate relationship among this doctrine
among tribes and in Indian country. When the mineral lease is
negotiated, for example, and the BIA insists on approval saying to the
tribal officials "You've got to do this and you've got to do that," the
tribal officials quite naturally respond to the BIA, "What are we?
Children? Why are you looking over our shoulder? We're sovereign
nations. Go away." But, of course, existing federal statutes indicate that
the mineral lease must be approved. Federal approval is part of the
modem essence of the federal trust responsibility. The 1938 Indian
Mineral leasing Act 2 and the Mineral Development Act of 19823 both
expressly impose the fiduciary requirement of federal approval of the
2. Act of May 11, 1938, c. 198, 52 Stat. 347, codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g. The
requirement for federal approval of Indian mineral leases is set forth at 25 U.S.C. § 396a.
3. Pub. L. 97-387, 96 Stat. 1938, codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101-08. The federal approval
requirement for Indian mineral development agreements is set forth in 23 U.S.C. § 2102(a).
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lease or other mineral agreement. This statutory requirement of
approval is the basic problem that Professor Royster's paper addresses.
While tribes object to this requirement of federal approval as a
paternalistic relic of colonialism, when the federally approved mineral
development deal goes sour, if it does, and the tribe often looks around,
as in the case Bill Rice poses, for a trustee to pick up the pieces. In such
cases, the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the affected tribe switch gears.
The tribal officials say to the federal authorities, "Wait a minute.
There's a trust responsibility. We want to sue you. You let us sign an
improvident deal" or "You let us get into a situation where we have all
of these lessees and assignees and people waiting to foreclose on interests
that they can't foreclose on running around our reservation and it's
your fault, not ours." And the tribe wants to be able to sue. On the
other hand, the BIA, which was so eager to get involved in the mineral
project at the front end, now claims that it is not an insurer of the deal
and wants to have as little to do with the project as possible.
These examples highlight the lack of any coherence to the
perceptions of the trust responsibility in Indian Country. Now I think
the trust responsibility has not historically been a monolithic, stable
doctrine. It has been misunderstood. It has evolved and changed
dramatically over time. I think one cannot understand the questions that
Professor Royster's paper addresses unless one understands that historic
evolution. Furthermore, it is important to understand that some of the
demands that tribes make on the United States as trustee and which
Professor Royster's paper addresses come out of a certain way of
looking at the relationship between the United States and the tribes.
Frankly, I think much of that set of perceptions needs to be seriously
rethought.
Professor Royster's paper, like many conventional discussions of
the trust responsibility, begins by looking at the case of Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia.4 Cherokee Nation is usually seen as the origin of the trust
responsibility. Specifically, many credit Marshall's reference in
Cherokee Nation to tribes as domestic dependent nations, as originating
the trust responsibility. The dependency aspect of that phrase is often
thought to be the beginning of the doctrine of the Indian trust
responsibility. Now that's not to say that the doctrine did not have
antecedents.
There literally were colonial trustees occasionally
appointed to Indian tribes like the Mohicans, for example. But putting
those colonial aspects to the side for a -second, we usually trace the
doctrinal roots of the trust responsibility to Chief Justice Marshall's
4. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
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reference in Cherokee Nation to Indian tribes as domestic dependent
nations, like wards in a state of pupilage.
In general, Marshall did not have federal management of Indian
land in mind at all when he wrote about dependency in Cherokee Nation.
The reference to dependency in Cherokee Nation played the same role
in that opinion that the beginning of this famous opinion in Marbury v.
Madison5 played. Chief Justice Marshall's reference to dependence was
a way by which he could decide the case without deciding the case. In
both cases he held that the Court did not have any jurisdiction to decide
the case. What was all this other stuff about dependence then?
MR. DELORIA: What were all them other sentences?
MR. CLINTON: Yes. As my friend P.S. Deloria at the end of the
table says, "What were all them other sentences about?" What they were
about involved deciding the merits of the case, saying something about
the merits in a context where the chief justice knew he couldn't get his
opinion enforced. And what was all this stuff about the dependence
about? Well, the Cherokee had already been to Congress. They'd
already been to the president to enforce their treaties. They had been
consistently told that the United States would not enforce the duties of
protections established in the Treaty of Hopewell 6 and the Treaty of
Holsten.7 Thus, the United States government had first solemnly
promised the Cherokee Nation protection from intrusion and invasion in
these treaties and within a quarter-century, the political branches of the
federal government then turned around and indicated to the Cherokees
that those promises would not be fulfilled precisely when such protection
was required. This duty of protection was a bargained-for arrangement.
The discussion in Cherokee Nation about dependence, therefore,
was not, as some scholars have argued, about racial inferiority or
subjugation. Neither was it about land or resource management, or
dependence in that sense. It was about the duties and obligations of
protection that the United States owed to the Cherokee Nation.
Marshall's references to dependence and wardship therefore represented
a criticism of the political branches of government for defaulting on
those obligations. Notice that federal obligations of political and
military protection have nothing whatsoever to do with land
management, with reviewing tribal decisions about resources, or anything
else.

5. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
6. Treaty with the Cheroke Nation, Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18.
7. Treaty with the Cherokee Nation, July 2. 1791,7 Stat. 39.
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Well, then how did we get to a position in which the federal
government assumed primary management responsibility for most
Indian land and resources? The answer lies in the fact that the
trusteeship notion was utilized in the late nineteenth century as a source
of federal power, of federal oversight, rather than, as Marshall had
intended it, as a source of federal protective obligation toward the tribes.
This late nineteenth century use of the trusteeship was part and parcel of
late nineteenth century American colonial expansion and imperialism.
During this period, the federal trusteeship over Indian affairs was used to
justify a newly emerged plenary power doctrine in Indian affairs. The
notion of plenary power over Indian affairs did not exist at the time of
the framing of the Constitution but, rather, emerged instead in the
Kagama8 case, the Lone WolJ9 case, and in the SandovallO case. The
notion of plenary federal power therefore historically emerged through
the Court's warping of the Cherokee Nation opinion reference to
dependence. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century,
colonialist 'white man's burden' argument, which assumed the
inferiority of the Indians and the need for federal supervision of their
resources, based on their alleged incapacity. Out of that myth emerged
the various leasing and economic development statutes that require
federal supervision, including the surface leasing statutes,,1 mineral
leasing statutes, 12 and timber development statutes. 13 That these statutes
which, for the first time, call for federal oversight of tribal land
management decisions first emerged during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries is not surprising because this period represented the
height of American imperialism. In some of my scholarship, I have
identified the colonialism in federal Indian law as emerging during this
period, the late 19th, early 20th century. 14 It was part of American
imperialism and expansionism during this period.
8. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (sustaining on trusteeship grounds the power of
Congress to enact criminal statutes for intra-tribal crimes theretofore exclusively handled by the
tribes).
9. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (sustaining the power of Congress to unilaterally
abrogate or ignore the provisions of prior Indian treaties on the basis of the federal government's
plenary power over Indian affairs derived from the trusteeship).
10. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913) (sustaining on trusteeship grounds the plenary
power of Congress to apply the Indian liquor control laws to the New Mexico Pueblos despite the fact
that their lands were held in fee simple and their members were citizens).
11. E.g., 25 U.S.C. § 415.
12. E.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1909, c. 263, 35 Stat. 783, codified at 25 U.S.C. § 396; Act of May 29,
1924, c. 210, 43 Stat. 244, codified at 25 U.S.C. § 398; Act of Mar. 3, 1927, c. 299, 44 Stat. 1347,
codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 398a-398e; Act of May 11, 1938, c. 198,52 Stat. 347, codified at 25 U.S.C. §§
396a-396g.
13. E.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 406,407.
14. E.g., Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest:A Vision Questfor a Decolonized
FederalIndian Law, 46 ARK. L. REv. 77 (1993).
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Thus, the trusteeship to which Professor Royster's article is
addressed is precisely part of that same period. The necessity of having
federal approval for land use, for having federal approval for leases, for
federal oversight of all kinds of tribal decision making as if the tribe
were incapable of managing its economic affairs itself doesn't come
from Marshall and it doesn't come from Cherokee Nation but it comes
from this late nineteenth century colonial expansion.
The trusteeship evolved again beginning in the 1930s and greatly
accelerating after World War II with the emergence of the Indian Claims
Commission. At this point in time, i.e., during the post-holocaust era, the
United States sought to try to do something about prior harms, and other
wrongs to Indians, and the process created many more, through the
Claims Commission. During this period the legal doctrine of the federal
trusteeship over Indian affairs evolved into a source of right. All of a
sudden the trusteeship, instead of being either a source of federal
obligation or an authorization for federal power, became a theory under
which Indian tribes could sue the United States for.something that the
United States had done wrong to them in the past. Notwithstanding the
fact that the opinion in Cherokee Nation, the alleged source of the
trusteeship, indicated that Indian tribes could unilaterally sue in federal
courts, the trusteeship metamorphosed into a source of legally
enforceable rights in the last half of the twentieth century. Often such
cases involved federal mismanagement of Indian resources.15 And until
the Nevada16 case, to which Professor Royster's paper in part is
addressed, this source of right generally applied classic private trust law
principles. To some extent, the discussion in Professor Royster's paper
approaches the problem through classic trust law principles.
I want to turn to the question of whether classic trust law principles
can be applied to this unique relationship between Indian tribes and the
federal government. I want to do that by calling your attention to a
Navajo tribe case, not the one mentioned in Professor Royster's paper,
although it's factually very similar, but a slightly different, later case.
The reason I'm carrying around this book to which Bill referred is
because it has the citation and a description of the case. The case in
question is Navajo Tribe vs. United States.17 There were a number of
tribal claims involved in this case surrounding uranium mining, most of
it originating from the controversial Manhattan project, i.e., the
development of the atomic bomb. The case centered on secret uranium
15. Eg., Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942); Menominee Tribe v. United
States, 101 Ct. Cl. 10 (1994); Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes v. United States, 512 F.2d 1390 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
16. 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
17. 9 Cl. Ct. 227 (1985).
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mining that occurred on the Navajo reservation during World War II.
One of the claims, the one I want to talk about for a second, is a claim
for breach of the trust duty of undivided loyalty because the United
States went out and explored for uranium secretly on the Navajo
reservation, of course, found it. Having discovered the badly needed
uranium, the federal government eventually decided that it was going to
enter into leases for the uranium mining with the tribe, but it never
sought or secured permission to explore for the mineral on Indian land
in the first place. It did it secretly and quietly during the height of
World War II, attempting to get the highly secret Manhattan project off
the ground. Now, this case, decided after Nevada, was decided very
differently than a similar Navajo Tribel8 case involving helium
development, which is cited in Professor's Royster's paper, which is
decided before Nevada. I want you to imagine attempting to apply
classic trust principles in the Manhattan Project case. What would a
private trustee be obligated to do if the trustee had the same conflicting
burdens of national defense during World War II and burden imposed
by federal statute of representing the land management interests of the
Navajo tribe? Well, the duty of undivided loyalty would require that the
private trustee's conflict of interest be resolved and generally, one would
hope, the resolution would come by the trustee stepping down in favor
of a trustee who was not so conflicted. Can the United States, the trustee
for Indian resources, step out of its conflicted interests in the Manhattan
Project? In this case was it supposed to just stop developing the atomic
bomb because it also was trustee for the Navajo tribe? Or, alternatively,
was it supposed to develop the atomic bomb and stop being the trustee
for the Navajo tribe? Notice that, unlike a private trustee, the United
States simply cannot resolve its problems by resorting to the behavior we
would expect in like circumstances of the private trustee. Whatever else
is true, there will always be competing national interests that the United
States feels on occasion it must pursue.
I read Nevada, the case that Professor Royster discusses extensively,
a little bit differently than her paper presents it. I read it as reflecting the
Supreme Court's realization that in the context of conflicts of interest,
private trust law analogies will work for enforcing the Indian trust
responsibility. What I see the Court as having decided in Nevada was
that it opted for procedural, rather than substantive trust protections.
What do I mean by that? Instead of applying the substantive law
generally applicable to the obligations of trustees in the private sphere,
the Court will look to the question of whether procedurally the United
18. 364 F.2d 320 (Ct. CI. 1966).
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States has tried to separate out its various interests and to zealously and
separately represent the Indian interest within a decision-making process,
often taking place possibly wholly within the Department of Interior. If
the United States has separately presented and argued for the Indian
interest, then federal government has met its trusteeship obligations,
notwithstanding its conflict of interest. If, on the other hand, the federal
government ignored the procedural requirements of separately
representing the Indian interests, then it has not satisfied its trust
obligations. Notice that on this reading of the Nevada case, the outcome
is irrelevant. The only important question is the antecedent procedure
under which the decision was made.
To some extent, the Court's approach is like the solution to the
problem of conflict of interest posed by President Nixon's proposal for
an Indian Trust Council Authority. The idea that formed the core of
that proposal was that because the United States always has a conflict of
interest, procedurally there has to be an entity or agency that will only
have the Indian trust obligation at heart. Now, if I am correct about my
interpreatation of the Nevada case, the Court has clearly moved away
from the idea of full substantive trust responsibility as a legally
enforceable obligation against the United States. Instead, it has imposed
a legally enforceable procedural obligation to make sure there is full
representation of Indian interests. But if there was full representation,
then you cannot sue the federal government for breach of trust based
solely on actual outcome. Incidentally, this approach is precisely what I
understand the Indian Mineral Development Act to provide.1 9 The
outcome is not the sole determinant. The United States is not an insurer
of the success of the bargain.
In Iowa we have a slogan you hear around, you can't make a silk
purse out of a sow's ear. If I'm right that the United States is always
conflicted as a trustee, then it seems to me that in Indian country the
better way to begin to think about the process of mineral and other land
development vis-a-vis the trustee is to abandon efforts to enforce
substantive limitations of undivided loyalty on the trustee. You're not
going to get undivided loyalty however much you try to enforce an
obligation. Rather, instead of trying to make a silk purse out of a sow's
ear, federal Indian law should move back to Chief Justice Marshall's
conception of the trust responsibility as a doctrine that simply involves
federal legal obligations of protection of Indian tribes against intrusions
from third parties on their lands, resources, and sovereignty. Federal
Indian law should move away from the models of federally supervised
19. 21 U.S.C. § 2103 (e).
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Indian resource development set forth in the 1938 Mineral Leasing Act
and the 1982 Indian Mineral Development Act. Rather, the tribes, with
technical assistance from the United States, should assume the ultimate
responsibility for their deals. No federal approval should be required.
The tribal governments should be required to assume the political
accountability if and when those deals go sour.
MR. RICE: Thank you very much. Perhaps one of the things
Professor Clinton was addressing was the dilemma that Dean Davis, from
the University of North Dakota Law School, mentioned over lunchtime
at a little conference up here on the bench. Maybe one of the problems
is when we Indians go over to the State and federal courts, we find that
there is a lack of consistency and predictability about what law is going
to be applied, and what the outcome might be given the circumstances of
the case. And perhaps that's kind of where we're coming out.
The next fellow who's going to come up and talk, (unlike me who
went from university to university), got invited back to Yale after his
B.A. to get his J.D. He's been a deputy assistant secretary for Indian
Affairs in the Department of the Interior. He's an enrolled member of
the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and currently is the Director of the
American Indian Law Center in Albuquerque, my friend Philip Sam
Deloria.
MR. DELORIA: Thank you, Bill. I enjoyed Professor Royster's
paper very much. I learned a lot from it and she looked up a lot of stuff
that I've wondered about for many years. I was sick the day they did
the library tour and I don't know how to use the computer. I have to
wait for people to get interested in the same things I am and then read
their paper. Bob Clinton's one of my best friends, and the reason for
that is he says so elegantly and passionately and forcefully the wrong
things. It gets me really oriented. I get all confused. I thought I knew
something about this and when Professor Royster got done I thought,
Oh, God, I don't know anything about it. And then Clinton just said
what he said, and, yeah, I do understand it.
The problem with the Trust Council Authority is precisely the
problem that we've been talking about. I've been saying for a long time
the conflict of interest cannot be resolved as a private trustee. It can only
be managed, unless you get rid of one of these obligations. And you
know which one they have to get rid of if they get rid of one-that's us
and not the public interest. The problem with the Trust Council
Authority is precisely that it moves in the wrong direction.
The process that has to be looked at is the process of
decision-making. The Trust Council Authority essentially takes the
Indian interest out of decision-making and moves them to an office
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building over in Virginia someplace, which means that when the Interior
Department people sit down to decide what we're going to do, I can read
you preemptively the transcript of the conversation. If anybody says at
the meeting, "What about the Indians," and it's unlikely that they will,
the answer will be "We don't need to worry about them. They have
their lawyers over in Virginia and they can sue us." Now, in the
day-to-day decision-making process you can see the result of that.
Everybody in the government is freed from thinking about the impact
on Indians.
In law school professor terms you can see another very important
consideration, and, that is, it is one thing to be in the room when a bunch
of GS-13s decide that eight timber companies embody the public
interest and you're in the room and you can say, "Here's all the reasons
why you should look at the Indian interest this way," and you may
persuade them and you may not persuade them, but it depends on your
ability to go to that meeting. If you say, "We're going to handle this by
hiring any number of lawyers," although the amount of resources
devoted to the Trust Council Authority, which was supposed to be a
separate litigating unit, the amount of resources that would be devoted to
that is an important consideration because they may be going up against
the entire Justice Department at any point.
But what's even more important than that is where do they look?
Where are these issues addressed? They're addressed in court. And
when they're addressed in court, you're asking a federal judge to
substitute his or her judgment for that of an administrative agency, and
then you get into the very problems that Professor Royster has pointed
out. It is one thing to persuade a bunch of GS-13s that your version of
what the federal government owes to the Indians is correct. It's quite
another thing, after all these decisions have been made and deference is
going to be given to the executive agency, to persuade a court to just
throw all that out and go back. So that's why the Trust Council
Authority, I think, is the wrong thing and that's why I think we have to
look not at a process of separating out the Indian interest but, in fact, the
process of bringing out the grain in the total federal responsibility. And
what I was trying to talk about this morning a little bit is to look at the
places where decisions are made and look at what stage in the process
does anybody, particularly the federal decision makers, address the
Indian interest and define what that is? And as Professor Royster was
talking-we're talking about balances, that's fine. But, again, at what
point in the process are you balancing and what is it you're balancing?
Here's what I think the problem is:- Stage one of my chart of the
decision-making process, stage one is you decide what your legal
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obligation is. To whom do you have a legal obligation? What is your
responsibility in a particular situation? And stage two then is to, if
necessary, balance that responsibility under this constitutional provision
or this statutory provision or this Indian trust doctrine or whatever. You
balance that. The ones that compete balance against each other. What
happens in my opinion, what the federal government is allowed to do is
to treat stage one non-Indian situations as if they were stage two, which
to me begs the question.
Here's what I mean: The Reclamation Act gave the Secretary of
Interior authority to assist in the chartering of irrigation districts all over
the country and to make water available to them, make money available
to them for the development of water resources in the West. The passage
of the Irrigation Act didn't give to any individual human being or entity
any rights whatsoever other than to apply for benefits under the Act.
Now, if I'm wrong about this, somebody tell me. This is my
understanding. The day after the Reclamation Act was passed you had a
bunch of Indian tribes and individuals in the West with a claim on the
Secretary's loyalty that day and you had everybody in the United States
with no claim on the Secretary's loyalty until they could get from stage
one to stage two and qualify as beneficiaries under the Act. And so if
there's one cup of water left in the West and that cup of water is claimed
by Indians as a trust matter and a bunch of people show up at the
Secretary's office and say, "Give us some of those forums under the
Reclamation Act," the Secretary's supposed to say, "I'm sorry.
There's no water left." And he doesn't owe them anything because
they haven't qualified to claim his loyalty, his divided loyalty.
I think a lot of the problems we have in sorting these out is we are
elevating what is not clearly a formed and vested non-Indian interest and
allowing that to compete with an Indian interest prematurely becauseand I think a lot of it is largely a function of the structure of the federal
government-nobody said to all those reclamation guys in 1980
"Don't go organizing irrigation districts where you're going to take
Indian water," because the assumption was the Bureau would take care
of the Indians. We'll create the irrigation district.
So, I think we need to look at the stage in the process and whether
we are comparing-if we're going to allow the federal government to
claim it has a conflict of interest as it did in Maine as I was saying this
morning-we have to look at what stage in the process they're claiming
they have a problem because I think they tend to, instead of shielding
and making room for the Indians, they kind of shield the Indians and
wait until the non-Indians qualify under some legislation. And then they
can say, "Thank God they qualified. Now we have a conflict of interest
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and we can't do what we're supposed to do for the Indians." I look to
use the private analogy which I think can be useful. All of these are
metaphorical. I mean, we always have to realize that we're not using
these terms literally.
In looking at it in a paper I did some time ago, it seems to me that
there are three kinds of situations where the federal government has a
conflict which may or may not be a conflict of interest. When the
federal government is claiming the same property, a piece of land or
some water for itself that the Indians also want, there couldn't be a more
classic conflict of interest than that. That is a conflict of interest. "It's
mine." "No, it's mine." "Wait a minute, you're my trustee." By the
way, the assistant attorney general for lands, I understand, denies that
even that's a conflict of interest. So remind me not to hire her for my
bank when she gets out of the government.
The second one is in the application of taxes to an Indian situation.
And there have been a lot of cases about the IRS claiming that certain
things were taxable and the government hassling about that. It seems to
me that a private fiduciary has an obligation to seek, on behalf of the
trust, to avoid as many taxes as legally possible.
The third-and I'm not discussing the second because I want to get
to the third one. The third one is where there is a conflicting statutory
obligation, regulatory in particular, which applies to the management of
Indian trust property. Seems to me, by the same token, if you look at
what the obligation of a private trustee would be, a private trustee would
be obligated to do whatever's in the best interests of the trust. In some
instances, that would be to argue that the trust property is included in
some regulatory statute where there's some question of whether it is or
not, to protect the trust, and in other cases the obligation would be to
argue that they're not included. And the trustee would have to decide
what that is.
Now, the reason I mention these three things is because it seems to
me that we're facing the same problem of getting the comparisons in
sync. The federal government first has to decide the scope of the Indian
claim to either be included in a tax or regulatory statute or to be
excluded before it can decide how it's going to balance the interest.
Very often, when you see what they're balancing, they're balancing an
assumption that a statute applies in a way that the Indians don't want it to
apply with the claim of the Indians to get out from under it. And I think
that is comparing two different stages.
It seems to me that you could argue, plausibly at least, that it is the
obligation-the moral-the procedural obligation of the government,
before it decides whether income from trust allotments are taxable or
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whether its position is going to be that they're taxable, to decide whether
it as trustee should give the Indian claim for exemption the widest
possible plausible scope and then decide what the scope of the tax law is.
They don't do that and I think that's part of the procedural problem.
That's why I argued this morning that because it's so hard to frame
these in the abstract, the best thing to do is for the Indians to be able to
attend these meetings where these things are decided so we can say at the
right point in the process "Here's how you should read this law because
we don't figure that Congress passed the Reclamation Act intending to
give away water that it had obligated to us." And if we have to read all
these statutes together, then you have to interpret the Reclamation Act as
being limited by the preexisting commitments to the Indians. The same
way with tax statutes. The same way with regulatory statutes.
MR. RICE: Our next speaker is a member of the Houma Tribe of
Louisiana. He took a B.A. from Dartmouth College and his J.D. from
Loyola University in New Orleans, Louisiana. He was the Director of the
Dartmouth Native American Program between '86 and '89 and is now
an Associate Professor of Law at Vermont Law School, Mr. N. Bruce
Duthu.
MR. DUTHU: The problem with going third or fourth or fifth is
that you run out of people that you can say you agree or disagree with.
But I do agree and disagree with a lot of what has already been said. I
want to start with my own little war story that bears on this issue of the
trust responsibility and take one particular person back in time, and
that's P. S. Deloria who was just up here. During my second year of
running the Native American Program at Dartmouth, we hosted a
symposium on federal Indian law and among the participants were Sam
Deloria; Charles Wilkinson; Rennard Strickland; the then governor of the
Penobscot Nation, James Sappier; and the Solicitor of Interior, Ralph
Tarr, who was a keynote speaker and also was a Dartmouth alum. He
was very much looking forward to coming back to his alma mater.
During the question-and-answer portion of the keynote address,
Governor Sappier, then governor of Penobscot Nation, asked a question.
His question was: "I know you're the government's lawyer. Are you
my lawyer?" And Solicitor Tarr could not answer the question. He
thought long and hard. And he said, "Let me think about that."
Fortunately it was a two-day conference because the next day the roles
were reversed and Sappier and others were on the dais, and Tarr was out
in the audience. When it was our turn for the question-and-answer
session, Tarr was the first hand eager to get up and say, "I have an
answer."
And we said, "To what?"
"To Governor Sappier's
question." And his response went something along these lines: "When
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our interests are congruent, when I can look at what we're doing, we
being the federal government, as being in line with what we think is in
the best interest of the tribes, then I'm your lawyer, too. When we
disagree, when there is an incongruence between what we've identified as
what the feds want to do and what we think the tribes want to do, then
you'd better get your own lawyer." Governor Sappier kind of looked
at the rest of us and I don't know that he was happy with that answer but
that's the answer he got.
My point in bringing that in and to echo many of the things that
have already been said here is to express agreement with part of what
Professor Clinton has said. I also find this area to be one of the most
vexing issues and I think that my students find as one of the most
troubling artifacts of federal Indian law. And I think the reason that we
find it to be an artifact of federal Indian law is for a lot of the reasons
that Sam Deloria talked about and that Professor Clinton has talked
about: we haven't really reconciled a lot of things that the trust
relationship conjures up.
For me, what the trust relationship conjures up is our inability as a
community, as a body politic, to confront a very conflicted history, the
role of history, the treatment of Indian tribes, and the treatment of Indian
people. That is to say, when you look at that history, and Professor
Clinton has very eloquently, as usual, outlined and contextualized for us
the trust relationship and has noted and described for you quite clearly
the evolving nature of the trust responsibility. I would submit that one
of the main things that caused or precipitated that evolution of the trust
responsibility is one very simple thing: tribes were not playing with the
program. You see, tribes weren't expected to last as body politics for
very long. You look at the historical record. Very early on, some of the
founding fathers, President Jackson, and others, expressly stated their
sentiments that the government should stop this entire foolishness of
treatying with tribes. Tribes should get with the program, and join this
larger body politic being formed, the United States of America. This
whole aspect of maintaining some sort of a separateness, "measured
separatism" to use Professor Charles Wilkinson's term, was really a
romanticized harkening back to the way things used to be, the good old
days, that tribes would never retrieve. I would submit that that sentiment
is one that the federal government has had to come to grips with, the fact
that tribes were even able to survive such oppressive policies as we
witnessed in the nineteenth century, the allotment policy being just one
of many. Wounded Knee comes to mind, as do BIA regulations that
outlawed religious expression, language, appearance, dress codes,
boarding schools, indeed, the entire panoply of efforts to de-Indianize
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Indian people. So the reason why we had to keep changing the trust
responsibility or to keep redefining it was because Indians were not
going along with the way that history had been preordained for them or
at least, the colonizers' view of historical development.
Well, I am going to talk about Professor Royster's paper but I
wanted to put that out first to give you some context for where I'm
coming from in the way that I've approached the trust responsibility or
the trust relationship. I want to say two things in particular about the
remarks that have been made and leading right into Professor Royster's
wonderful paper, which I found to be a very, very easy read. For me,
reading is difficult and I have no hesitation in admitting that, knowing
that there are law students out here. I'm a terribly slow reader. I don't
understand things the third time I've read them. And this was a pleasure
to just go through. As usual, Professor Royster's writing is so clear that,
one time around, I think I got everything that was there. For me, that's
an accomplishment.
Two questions that I pose after reading the paper, one that has
already been touched on, and that is, are we moving in the right
direction? When we talk about having a trust responsibility that in the
contemporary era, provides tribes with an enforcement mechanism, that
is, a means to extract something from the federal government, that's a
good thing. I mean, tribes would and I think do appreciate any of the
ammunition that the law will afford, and if the trust responsibility or
relationship can be utilized to demand that the federal government take
into account the Indian voice, then all to the good. But the larger
question looming behind that is, do we continue to set a negative
precedent by framing arguments that continue to utilize the trust
relationship as a linchpin for continued protection? That is, does it force
tribes to take on an infantilized view of their very political selves that
they would rather not do and instead, move towards what both Professors
Clinton and Deloria talked about, which is the business of being
sovereigns in their own right, negotiating, as I think Justice Marshall
conceded, government to government? I don't know. I think the trust
relationship is here for a while because I just have this sense that the
states, private entities, and the federal government are not at the point
where they can conceive of tribes playing the kind of substantively
significant roles that many tribes are already playing and many more
want to play; that is, being at the table, negotiating, talking, being in
control of their destiny, destinies of their people, et cetera. And I think
the federal role is going to be, at least for the foreseeable future, a
necessary evil; to prevent a retrogression of the gains that have been
made in the modern era such that whether the assault on tribal
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sovereignty is coming from state aggression or private party litigation or
even from the United States Supreme Court, which we'll talk about later
on this afternoon, there needs to be, I think, that protective mechanism
there.
The second question or issue that sparked some thoughts from
Professor Royster's paper is a very specific point that she makes with
regard to the environmental impact considerations already being put on
the table. The Secretary, in developing the EIS, environmental impact
statements mandated by NEPA, is already taking into account the
environmental impact and, consequently, there should be no additional
weighing of these larger environmental impacts in the context of mineral
development in Indian Country. Professor Royster notes that tribes
derive some benefits from the EIS process; the process does serve to
provide a wealth of information for the tribes to make informed
decisions about what the proposed development will mean to them.
That's a positive. A negative, according to Professor Royster, and I
quote, 20 "To the extent that the EIS, environmental impact statement,
must consider the adverse environmental consequences of tribal
development on lands and resources outside Indian country, it
introduces non-Indian considerations into the secretary's approval
process. Moreover, neighboring non-Indian interest may at least delay
projects on lands by challenging the adequacy of the EIS in federal
2
court." 1

Now, perhaps I am reading those provisions much, much too
myopically. My first reaction was, why are the considerations of adverse
environmental consequences, even those outside the Indian country,
necessarily viewed as "non-Indian" considerations? Why wouldn't
tribal members be concerned that whatever occurs within their
reservations not negatively impact their neighbors? The point that Judge
P. Diane Avery made in her wonderful address at lunchtime struck a
chord with me and that was her use of the term "respect." That's
something that growing up in the bayous in Louisiana in my community
was very much a part of the way that I was raised, respect not just for my
ways, for my culture, but for everyone and everything around me.
Unless I am a steward of everything that is around me, bringing the
proper respect, I won't have much of a future. I'm wondering whether a
suggestion that the Secretary not do any further assessment of the
impacts outside of Indian country will possibly lead to enhanced

20. Throughout this commentary, Professor Duthu's references are to an earlier draft of
Professor Royster's paper.
21. Emphasis was added by Professor Duthu.
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hostilities between Indian tribes and their neighbors. Will that work
towards the larger good or the larger goal of tribal self-determination?
Or is it going to take us down a road where we are continually finding
ourselves pitted against states, private developers, others outside of Indian
country because we're so busy trying to get the federal government to
maintain its obligations that we may not take into full account the impact
that we're having on others outside of Indian country? Thank you.
MR. RICE: Our final formal speaker is a guy who could hometown
a lot of lawyers around here, I guess. Richard Monette grew up in Turtle
Mountain, and is an enrolled member of the tribe. He's been with the
Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs as director of their
office of congressional and legislative affairs and has also served as a
staff attorney on the U.S. Senate Committee on Indian Affairs. He is
currently an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin.
Professor Monette.
MR. MONETTE: I'll just sit here if that's okay, too. First I'd like
to thank the North Dakota Law Review for inviting me home. Nice to be
home. I went to graduate school here ten-starting a long time ago,
twelve or thirteen years ago. I also have the distinction of at least most
recently sitting on the other side of the fence, so to speak, in this trust
responsibility, trust relationship debate. I spent the last year working
with the Department of Interior with the Bureau of Indian Affairs. And,
you know, there haven't been enough stories told today. So I'm going
to tell a story real quick-like. A lot of you probably don't know how I
got that job and it's somewhat of an interesting story. When Clinton was
elected president, you know, he appointed Ada Deer, a Menomonie tribal
member and also on the faculty of the University of Wisconsin, to be the
Assistant Secretary. And, you know, Democrats hadn't been in office
for a while so they were somewhat unsure of how things worked. And
Ada, in particular, wasn't sure, and she said, "Bill, how am I going to
choose who's going to work with me? How do you decide these
things?" And he said, in his folksy way, "Very simple, Ada. What I did
is I just presented a little riddle to them. I presented a little riddle and if
they could answer it, they could work with me; and if they couldn't, they
couldn't work with me. That's how I chose Al and the whole bunch."
She said, "Oh, that sounds great. Sounds great. What's the riddle?
Give me the riddle." He said, "Well, one of the best ones is ask them
'what's the name of your father's son who is not your brother."' Ada
thought about it for a while. "Okay. Okay. I can do that." So she was
getting ready to make her calls and she was a little bit uncertain, and she
called her good old friend Sam Deloria, and said, "Sam, you know, I got
this question, this riddle, and the President told me this is how I could
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choose who's going to work with me. But I'm not quite sure if I know
the answer, and I didn't want to tell him that." She said, "It's 'what is
the name of your father's son who is not your brother?"' And Sam
said, "Well, that's simple. It's me. Sam Deloria is the answer." She
said, "Oh, yeah. Yeah. That's what I thought. That's what I thought.
Good. Good." So she gives me a call, asks me the riddle "What is the
name of your father's son who's not your brother?" I said, "Geez,
Ada, that's kind of tough. Give me a couple days to think about it."
And I hung up and immediately called Sam. "Sam, what do you think
about this? Ada's asking me this riddle here to work with her. I'm not
quite certain what the answer is." He said, "Well, what is it?" And I
said, "Well, it's what is the name of your father's son who's not your
brother." And he said, "Yeah. Yeah. That's the simple riddle. It's
me, Sam Deloria. "Oh, okay. Okay. Good enough." So she calls
back in a couple days and asks me, "What is the name of your father's
son who is not your brother?" You guessed it. I said, "Well, I know
that one." I had a big smile on my face. I said, "It's me, Sam
Deloria." Ada scratched her head in her way and kind of frowned a
little bit, and she said, "How did you know?" I got the job.
I took the job, on a somewhat more serious note, to work just on two
or three topics of special interest to me. I was very hesitant to go out
there. But a couple of the things that I wanted to do have a very strong
tie into the topic today, this trust responsibility, trust relationship thing.
And two of them in particular were the Self-Determination Act that was
being amended. And there was also the Self-Governance demonstration
project. I don't know if you know about these acts, but very simply, the
self-determination law allowed for tribes to contract for federal programs
and to operate them themselves. The self-governance project, very
simply, used the same idea but that the tribes didn't have to contract
program by program; rather, they could do a sort of a block grant for
several programs and then actually redesign them. But the idea of both
laws is for tribes to work federal programs themselves.
In this context that became immediately important because some of
the tribes put on the table first and foremost to contract for the Bureau
of Land Management and the BIA management of leases, mineral and
timber leases. And, I mean, I agree with what Professor Royster is saying
at least to the extent where she's talking about where the Secretary
weighs the interest using the trust responsibility of the tribe against the
Nation or the various States. But I also agree with Professor Clinton that
there is a totally different dimension that we, I think, are ignoring in this
debate. Again, I don't know if I quite follow his logic to his conclusion.
In fact, I might agree with Sam that maybe I wouldn't follow that down
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the path that Professor Clinton is following. I didn't hear what Bruce
agreed with or disagreed with, so I couldn't tell you if I disagree with
him or not.
First and foremost, I think it is time to simply ask one question with
some meaning, not just rhetorically. We've asked the question before,
others have often asked it: why is there even a trust responsibility? Why
is there a Leasing Act? Why is the Bureau of Indian Affairs managing
these leases or why is it at least reviewing these leases for approval or
disapproval? Why are they involved at all? And where is the tribe? Why
isn't the tribe dealing with all of this? Why isn't the tribe creating and
maintaining, sustaining its own property system from top to bottom,
leases, titles, deeds, having its own register of deeds, regulating
conveyances, everything? Why not? Why isn't this happening? And if
we, in fact, are going to start contracting out BLM and BIA leasing
programs, the BIA also runs the realty program which is a little thing that
most Americans don't know.
All of the states have a property system. Most of you don't know
that the federal government also runs a property system and they run it
for Indian tribes, a property system that scatters across 3000 miles in
varying directions, all kinds of land. Millions and millions, fifty, sixty
some million acres of land, and most Americans really don't know that.
And from that point most of us really don't know that when they do it,
they do it very badly. Now, some of it I believe-just to look at some of
the dimension that Professor Clinton was talking about is to back all the
way up. I believe there are a few myths that need to be debunked, a few
cases that I think have been characterized wrongly and must be re-read,
and some close reading that needs to be done.
Let me begin with three quotes. To touch on where Professor
Clinton was coming from, much of this development came out of the
General Allotment Act as you've heard, much of the source of these
problems of leasing coming out of the General Allotment Act when the
United States came in and divided up into severalty tribes' territories.
And the first place that I found, you know, we got this magic called
"Westlaw" and "Lexis" these days, the first place that I found the word
"allotment" used was, in fact, by Chief Justice John Marshall. Yet, I
haven't found this quote cited anywhere by any of our Indian law
scholars unless I missed something. Here's what he said: "To contend
that the word 'allotted"' -(he also used the word "allotment" but this
quote I think is better-allotted in reference to the land guaranteed to
the Indians in certain treaties)-"to contend that the word 'allotted'
indicates a favor conferred rather than a right acknowledged, it would
seem to me do injustice to the understanding of the parties." In other
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words, it doesn't matter that we're recognizing territory and property
and/or allotments. A critical question is, whose was it to begin with? The
answer to that question might have a little bit to do with whose is it now.
And he's saying the United States didn't confer this right. It came from
tribes, as does much of the idea of sovereignty in a Democratic system
comes from the people in the local areas, not from the federal
government, not from the big government. That point is clear in this
context.
One of the cases that is sorely mischaracterized is Johnson v.
M'Intosh,22 one of the only cases that ever makes it into a property text.
And there it stands for the proposition that all the property stems from
the sovereign. However, the issue as framed in the case is, can the tribe
issue a title that is sustainable in the courts of this country? And in his
holding, Justice Marshall repeats the issue almost the same way. The
tribe cannot issue title that is sustainable in the courts of this country.
Unfortunately, many of our scholars have taken that and shortened it
quite simply with some rather terse and heated language, coming
inevitably to one conclusion: that tribes can't issue title, period. And
that's not what the case says. It says: can they issue title that is
sustainable in the courts of this country? Two vastly different things.
But this idea that supposedly tribes can't issue title finds its way into the
discussion today when we're talking about whether the tribes can issue a
mineral lease. Unfortunately, we often hear that tribes can't do that sort
of thing. They can't run their own property systems.
Well, I pulled a little quote out of Johnson v. M'Intosh that, again, I
can't find quoted anywhere in the scholarship. Here's what Justice
Marshall says: "The person who purchases lands from the Indians within
their territory"-(and he uses the word "territory")-"incorporates
himself with them so far as respects the property purchased, holds their
title under their protection and subject to their laws." To me, that says a
tribe can issue title. That says a tribe can create and maintain its own
property systems. That's what Justice Marshall believed 150 years ago.
That says that the misreading and mischaracterization of the case has
hurt us greatly. Justice Marshall went on to say, "We know of no
principle which can distinguish this case from a grant to a native Indian
authorizing him to hold a particular tract of land in severalty." So, you
know, if the tribe wants to sell to Johnson and then take the territory
encompassing that and sell it to the United States who then grants a title
to M'Intosh, Johnson surely has lost his property. But his beef is not
with the United States. His beef is with the tribe who issued the title and
22. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823).
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then took it back and sold it. Unfortunately, the law, including the
scholarship and case law and everything else, has not followed that line
of thinking.
Now, one of the myths that goes along with this, and incidentally
one of our Indian scholars who most often mischaracterizes that case
also is the one who most often invokes this myth, and that is that tribes
don't have a concept of private property. And so then the argument
goes that the United States shouldn't be imposing their Anglo-American
concepts of private property on us. Well, I don't agree with that. I know
that my grandfathers had teepees and if you went in them, you were in
trouble; and my grandmothers had berry-picking patches and if you
picked berries in them, you were in trouble. Now if that's not private
property, I don't know what is. In fact, the case that I'm taking this
quote from has the attorney for the state using that argument against the
tribe. He said, "A doubt has been suggested whether this power in
Georgia extends to lands to which the Indian title has not been
extinguished." And then the attorney goes on to say, "What is this
Indian title? It's not like our tenures. They have no idea of a title to the
soil itself." In other words, from the beginning that very idea has been
most strongly used against us rather than for us.
So first, I say let's read Johnson v. M'Intosh right. It didn't say
tribes can't issue title. It said tribes couldn't issue title sustainable in the
courts of this country. And even that might have changed, which is yet
another theme, because when the tribe in that case issued that title, it
didn't have a treaty with the United States. Johnson was a lone
Anglo-American out there in the wilderness getting a chunk of land
from the Piankeshaw Tribe. But once the tribe entered into a treaty with
the United States, whether that title is recognizable in U.S. courts is a
totally different question because then the tribe is recognized. So first
we have to read that case right. Then we have to debunk a few of these
myths. Then we can come up to face some of these questions that are
difficult to deal with today and that are necessarily on the table if, in fact,
the self-governance and self-determination policies are going to mean
anything.
For example, in our case, this case that we're dealing with here
today, Boyd & McWilliams, suppose this little variation had been in play:
Suppose the U.S. owned the subsurface estate, managed by BLM, but
suppose rather than the tribe owning the surface it had been a Navajo
citizen, perhaps one who opposed the lease. Then suppose that the
Navajo Tribe said, "Fine. The lease is okay with us." Here it would
have been the tribe against its own citizen in what they wanted done with
that surface estate. And there it would have been the BIA in a position
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saying, "We owe a trust to the tribe. We owe a trust to this individual
Navajo citizen." Now, who do we side with? And to me, those are the
most common and the most difficult questions in this trust area.
Now, one of the ways I like to think about it is a way that we were
somewhat able to work into the Self-Governance Act, which was to think
of the trust owed to the tribe as a relationship, as a political idea. It is a
political relationship despite the term guardian-ward. Remember that
when Marshall used those words, there was no General Allotment Act
yet. The United States wasn't yet dealing with property of the tribes or
their members. It was purely a political matter. After the General
Allotment Act, we started hearing more and more this idea of
responsibility in the sense of fiduciary responsibilities as a property
concept. The political concept of trust and the property concept of trust
are, to me, two entirely different things.
Now, I would conclude, and the way that I think to a great extent,
although, unfortunately, not entirely, we were able to work it with the
Self-Governance Act, is that when the tribe's interests are at odds with
the individual tribal members, the political trust relationship prevails. I
hold that opinion for this particular reason, and it's a reason that ran
through some of the discussion this morning: the tribal individual is a
member and can participate in that tribe. They're citizens. They can
decide to change their government. They can decide to change their
government to rework whatever it is that they're unhappy within their
tribe's dealing with the BIA. They can amend their tribe's Constitution.
They can effect their tribal laws by electing and unelecting leaders. We
had an old term for that. It used to be called "democracy." It
apparently doesn't work anymore in Indian law. We don't think of it in
the Indian realm. Instead, we want to protect tribal members in federal
court. We want to defer to federal courts. We talk about federal court
abstention. We talk about deference to tribal courts. What about
deference to the entire sovereign so that the whole government can work,
so that the tribes' law-making bodies, law-executing bodies, and its
courts all function entirely from the bottom up? Then I think we get to
the idea that tribes can do this. Tribes can create their own property
systems. They have the mechanisms to work them. They will make
mistakes. Not everybody will be happy. But that is the seed of
democracy. Thank you very much.
MR. RICE: There's a couple of thoughts that I think the panel put
in my head, and maybe I'll share one or two of them with you now. If
we, in fact, go back and look at Johnson v. M'Intosh,23 and Cherokee
23. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823).

388

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 71:365

Nation v.. Georgia,24 and some of the early foundational cases and find
that by and large at least some attorneys, and some judges, have not read
them for what they say; if we look at the original understanding of the
Commerce Clause as reflected in the writings of the founding fathers; if
we look at the interpretation given to the constitutional provisions that
relate to Indians as reflected in the writings of the early justices; if we
acknowledge the warping that perhaps has occurred of some of those
ideas, some of those thoughts, as we went through the removal, the
reservation system, and allotment system, and compare that with the
United Nations conventions on things like genocide and
self-determination; perhaps we come to the conclusion, as did the courts
in Australia, that continuing to build an Indian law system on the
warping of these precepts is unjust. We started off the federal-tribal
relationship where dependent domestic nations meant, at least in my
view, dependent enclaves at international law. A dependent enclave is
simply one sovereign who happens to be surrounded by the territory of
another sovereign and has asked for the protection from the world of a
more powerful government without giving up any of its own rights of
self-government.
The examples are Monoco, the Vatican City,
Luxembourg, other principalities and small entities around the world
who have seats in the United Nations and diplomatic missions in
Washington. If we acknowledge the warping of the theories of early
Indian law as the federal government attempted to destroy tribal
government, we must also acknowledge that 150 years of attempts to
take the Indian out of Indians hasn't worked. We're still here, the
survivors are here. Surviving tribal governments are here, and will never
give up their desire to govern their own people and their own territory,
that which has been reserved to us by our forefathers. By the way, I call
them patriots. I've seen them referred to as Indian braves here and there
and warriors and whatever, but they were our patriots. And they kept for
us and reserved to us tracts of land now called "reservations" and
governments which we have organized and reorganized. Do we return to
that dependent enclave status of Worcester v. Georgia?25

24. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
25. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).

1995]

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

389

It's easy for America to look at Israel: it's easy to look at places in
the Middle East and elsewhere, the Kuwaits of the world, and say that
people are entitled to their own self-government without interference or
impact by other people. It's a lot harder to do that in your own back
yard. It's a lot harder to do that when it's right down the road. It's a lot
harder to do that when it hits you in your own pocketbook. It's a lot
harder to do that when it means the state doesn't get quite so much
taxes. The question that I see coming up is, whether America is
self-confident enough, sure of itself enough, mature enough to say that
we can tolerate true independent tribal self-government in our own
backyard, and we can acknowledge the full dependent enclave status that
Justice Marshall started with?
And to go along with that is the other concept that I saw come up,
which is the self-determination and self-governance idea. I think this
really reflects on the trust responsibility, and the problem that this paper
addressed when we come down to the question: "What happens when
the Secretary is out of the loop?" The Court has gone away from the
recognition and reliance on inherent tribal sovereignty as a sale ground
for exclusive tribal jurisdiction over particular matters, or joint federal
and tribal jurisdiction in particular matters and has of late relied on
federal preemption to protect tribes from the invasive application of state
or local law. As tribes become full of self-determination and full of
self-government (which are, as you know, primarily super program
management acts which are pregnant with the assumption that the tribe
will really assume jurisdictional and management capabilities later on
down the line), what do we do when the tribe is doing it all and the
Secretary is out of the loop? How do we rely on preemption when he's
not there? And I think those are some of the issues that are going to
face us in the future. That's my own take on this issue.
Do we have any questions?
FROM THE AUDIENCE: Professor Clinton asked, in effect, the
division that we should return to a trust relationship based on the
Cherokee decisions. And I think he remembers the Cherokee decisions
being maybe as the good and then he looks at perhaps the 1880s
decisions as being the bad. And I think that Professor Monette reminds
us that some scholars looked at Johnson v. M'Intosh as being the ugly or
of course his comment was that it's not as ugly as it appeared, and I
agree with that. However, the question, I guess, is to Professor Clinton,
don't you think, in effect, that Johnson v. M'Intosh and its holding had
a lot to do with the United States having a trust responsibility for the
tribes because it did-they do hold a legal title and we Indians only have
the beneficial title so that if you go back to a Worcester type of decision,
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sihould you perhaps decide to get rid of some of this, of this language in
Johnsmon, if you're going to do this? And do you think that perhaps
Justice Marshall in Worcester eventually got over Johnson v. M'Intosh
and perhaps did modify it in any case in that later decision?
MR. CLINTON: Actually I think I'm more with Professor Monette
on this question. I actually do not read Johnson v. M'Intosh in that way.
There's a little bit of history that actually is found in one of the books of
the unnamed professor who I think we've been referring to previously,
which actually sheds an awful lot of light on Johnson v. M'Intosh. In
the period of colonial rejection of crown authority before the revolution
there had been a significant movement to violate colonial restraints on
alienation of Indian land by people who simply went out and negotiated
on their own, in violation of colonial law, with tribes for direct grants.
What Johnson holds, as I understand it, isn't anything as broad as the
question would suggest. What it holds, I think, is that given the restraints
against alienation that gave the crown the exclusive right to purchase
Indian land, citizens of the crown or the subsequent sovereigns, like the
state of the United States, could not go out in violation of the sovereign's
rights and purchase that land themselves and expect that that sovereign's
courts would recognize the grant. But the end of the opinion quite
clearly says that there is absolutely nothing wrong with the tribe by its
own law and in its own forums recognizing the grant. Now, if you read
Johnson that way, and that is the way I've always read it, that Johnson
does not stand either for a tribal incapacity to grant legal title, nor does it
put the United States in a position of being trustee over Indian land. It
only puts the United States in a position as a result of the quite
controversial doctrine of discovery of being the potential exclusive
buyer particularly vis-a-vis its own citizens of that land. That's not a
trust. That's a United States regulation of the way in which it deals with
its own citizens and who it is among them that can deal with the Indian
tribes for the grant. The trustee merges out of a much later doctrine.
MR. MONETTE: In fact, even so much that I wouldn't use the
term that Professor Clinton uses. I wouldn't use the term "restraint on
alienation" because that's not what it was. It was a restraint on buying.
The Piankeshaw Tribe, Chippewa, Sioux, Winnebago, Sac, and Fox, all
went to a big treaty in 1825 where the United States happened to be
there because it was trying to facilitate the treaty but it was not a party to
it. Those tribes exchanged territory and the United States agreed so that
it could, of course, in turn buy some of the territory after it knew who
owned it. In other words, the tribes alientated territory to those not
subject to U.S. law-other tribes. So there was no restraint on alienation.
It was a restraint on purchase, restraining those over whom it could
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exercise restraint, those over whom it exercised its governance, its own
states and their people.
MR. CLINTON: I totally agree that's a better characterization.
FROM THE AUDIENCE: I have just one question on that: is that
consistent with the results in the Oneida cases, where it wasn't a question
of the non-Indians enforcing their title in federal court, rather it was a
question of the Oneida's ability to prosecute a trespass action? That
seems to me to be inconsistent with the reading. I think I understand
you.
MR. MONETTE: I hope I'm not oversimplifying it, but I think that
the Oneida were bringing their case under U.S. laws and saying that no
matter where the onus of the case fell the law says that the state of New
York and the county of Oneida and their citizens could not buy from the
tribe. So the tribe did not alienate in violation of U.S. laws. Rather the
state bought in violation of U.S. laws.
MR. CLINTON: I think that's basically accurate as to the Oneida
decisions which relate to the restraint on buying. It's classically called in
the literature the "Non-Intercourse Act Restraint" or occasionally
"restraint against alienation," but Richard is absolutely right, it's a
restraint on buying and a restraint on buying only over those who they
have some control over, their citizens. There is one Oneida decision that
seems somewhat inconsistent, and that is the I believe it's 1988 decision
of the Second Circuit dealing with the Oneida claims relating to state
acquisitions prior to the adoption of the Constitution and governed by
the Articles of Confederation. There seems to be an implication there,
not that private parties kept, but that the states could during the
confederation period negotiate. And that raised some serious questions
that up to that date had not been resolved about, one, the meaning of the
Articles of Confederation and, two, add independence, who had
succeeded to the crown's exclusive right of purchase vis-a-vis crown
citizens? Was it the state or the United States? It seems in later decisions
pretty clear that it probably was the states but subject to federal
regulatory control after the Constitution. The problem is I would have
read the Articles of Confederation differently than the Second Circuit
and suggested that even as of the articles period it was subject to
exclusive federal control.
So there is a marginal element of
inconsistency but not a total inconsistency because private citizens even
during the confederation period couldn't go out and negotiate with the
tribes. The relevant question is, which of the sovereigns could?
MR. RICE: I think, if memory serves me correctly, in the main
Oneida case the Oneida people never brought the claim that their
government at the time of the original agreement with the state of New
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York and the original sale, did not have the power to sell or that they
weren't the proper government, or any of those types of claims. What
they brought were the claims that those people didn't have the power to
buy, which was a totally different claim. And I think that brings it into
consistency if my memory serves me correctly.

